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I am delighted to have the opportunity to take part in such a
distinguished panel and, I might add, speak before such a distin-
guished audience, including one of our great former statesmen. I
am particularly delighted to have the opportunity to comment
upon the presentation by Professor Moore, who was a former col-
league and mentor of mine in the Legal Adviser's Office of the
State Department.
I think Professor Moore has given us an excellent historical sum-
mary of the development of legal principles in the area of interven-
tion. The present law is quite specific as to the circumstances in
which states may or may not become involved in civil wars in an-
other country. On one side of the equation, internationally ac-
cepted documents such as the United Nations Declaration on
Friendly Relations1 and the Definition of Aggression 2 contain very
clear and specific indications that assistance by one government to
insurgents fighting against another government is, in fact, an un-
lawful use of force under the United Nations Charter. This is, of
course, quite understandable since any such interference by one
government essentially against another government has all the un-
desirable and destablizing consequences, politically and legally, of
any other use of force by one government against another, and
could be highly dangerous to the stability of world order. The situ-
ation on the other side of the equation, in which assistance is given
by one government to another government when violence is occur-
ring within that state, is somewhat less clear than Professor Moore
has indicated. Various international documents contain general
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I Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
1292 (1970).
2 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710 (1974).
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principles, such as the principle of non-intervention, which are
stated rather broadly and are susceptible to differing interpreta-
tions. These principles, at least in the post-war period, have not
been uniformly applied by states so as to indicate that there is a
general prohibition on assistance to governments which are faced
with insurgent situations in their countries. However, it is certainly
true that we, as an international community or as private scholars,
do need to address this problem. Quite clearly, foreign intervention
in some circumstances, even with the consent of the government
involved, can produce destablizing or other undesirable conse-
quences. Therefore, we need to look for a sensible regime which
will be generally acceptable in the international community.
I would like to offer a few practical considerations from the
point of view of someone who is trying to deal on a day-to-day
basis with this kind of problem, considerations which should be
given careful attention when trying to develop legal standards to
govern this area. First, we have to remember that a government
which is considering assisting another government is working not
only within the confines of international law, but also within its
own domestic law and procedures. This is particularly true with
respect to the United States because Congress has had a very per-
sistent interest, particularly in the post-Vietnam period, in the
question of limitations on assistance by the United States govern-
ment to other governments which have violent situations or insur-
gencies within their boundaries. The body of United States domes-
tic law on this subject primarily consists of the Foreign Assistance
Act,3 the Arms Export Control Act' and the annual foreign assis-
tance authorization and appropriation legislation. These pieces of
legislation make quite clear that assisting foreign countries in pro-
viding for their internal security is a proper object of United States
security assistance. In the context of these statutes, internal secur-
ity refers to violence of an internal character above the level of
ordinary law enforcement tasks. However, other statutes place re-
strictions on situations in which such assistance may be provided.
The most prominent restriction is in the area of human rights. The
general provisions of section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act'
and specific limitations and requirements dealing with the individ-
ual circumstances of particular countries require that United
3 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2429 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
- 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2796 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
6 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1976).
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States security assistance to foreign countries, including military
assistance and the providing of military training personnel, be
granted in a manner which enhances and encourages observance by
the recipient country of internationally recognized human rights.
Under some circumstances, a suspension or termination of assis-
tance may be warranted if these requirements are not met. Al-
though this is just one national model for a description of the cir-
cumstances and limitations on involvement in foreign violent
situations, it is a particularly relevant one for us, and should be
considered as one possible starting point for the development of
international standards in this area.
As an alternative, or perhaps as a supplement, it has been sug-
gested by Professor Moore and others that there should be a legal
regime based essentially on the notion that when the level of vio-
lence in a country reaches a certain threshold, which has often
been referred to as an insurgency or civil war, then assistance
should terminate not only to the insurgents, but also to the govern-
ment. I would like to suggest a few practical problems which would
occur in persuading governments to accept such a general rule, and
in ensuring that they follow it even if they are prepared to accept
it. First, requiring one government which has a close and friendly
relationship with another, and which is providing assistance for a
wide variety of purposes, to withdraw that assistance at a certain
point in the development of an internal violent situation, perhaps
at the point when external assistance is most desired and most
necessary, runs counter to the policy thrust and the basic interests
of such governments. For example, to take a recent episode in the
history of the Salvadoran conflict, the last year of the Carter Ad-
ministration was marked largely by intermittent suspensions or re-
strictions on assistance to the Salvadoran government, primarily
for human rights reasons. But, in January 1981, the last month of
the Carter Administration, there was an immediate resumption
and a dramatic increase in the level of United States military assis-
tance. This increase was not the result of any significant change in
the human rights situation, but rather the result of a dramatic es-
calation in the current level of threat to the government because of
the so-called final offensive by insurgent forces. This is the normal
and natural reaction of a government which has an interest in a
continuing relationship with another government, but it would be
in this situation that the concept of a threshold would require the
withdrawal of assistance. In such a situation, a withdrawal of assis-
tance would never be perceived as a neutral act. To the contrary, it
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would be perceived as a political defeat for the government being
assisted. Therefore, the concept of a threshold upon which assis-
tance must terminate would probably be difficult to apply in prac-
tice because a supplying government which finds strong reasons to
continue its relationship will attempt to avoid having to terminate
assistance by stretching the facts or stretching the legal rationale.
The recipient government, if faced with the prospect of a termina-
tion of assistance, may be tempted to take draconian measures to
attempt to suppress opposition activities so that the threshold will
not be regarded as having been met. It is not clear that in practice
such a threshold would produce the right results.
The second practical problem is that military assistance relation-
ships are often used to apply leverage for the purpose of securing
better compliance by the recipient government with international
norms, particularly those related to human rights and to humane
conduct in the conflict. Historically, this has certainly been a fea-
ture of United States efforts. A desire to use security assistance
programs, at least to some extent, for leverage to increase human
rights compliance is a desire shared throughout the United States
political community. The effect of an automatic threshold requir-
ing termination of assistance would be, of course, to minimize the
possibility of using this aspect of one's relationship for this kind of
leverage.
Finally, I would like to address the intriguing question that Pro-
fessor Moore also addressed: is there a difference between El Sal-
vador and Afghanistan? Without belaboring the obvious, I want to
say, first of all, that I agree entirely with the points that Professor
Moore made about the fundamental differences between those con-
flicts. I would like to add a few further observations on the ques-
tion. First, clearly the conflict in Afghanistan is not an internal
conflict at all; it is an international conflict. It is a case of external
aggression, external occupation of one state by the armed forces of
another. It is a case where the existing government was physically
disposed of, a new government was installed, and a convenient in-
vitation to intervene was secured. Under those circumstances,
quite clearly the rules of international law which relate to interna-
tional armed conflicts apply. This includes not only those rules
which deal with the use of force, but also those rules which deal
with the conduct of armed forces during the conflict - the Geneva
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Protocol of 1925,6 the Geneva Conventions of 1949,7 and the cus-
tomary rules of law which apply in international armed conflict.
Furthermore, if other aspects of the two situations are compared,
fundamental differences can be seen. Consider the level and char-
acter of Soviet forces in Afghanistan as compared to United States
personnel in El Salvador. In El Salvador we have about fifty train-
ing personnel who do not engage in combat functions. In the case
of Afghanistan, over 100,000 Soviet combat personnel invaded the
country and continue to engage in massive fighting against local
insurgents and remnants of government forces. Furthermore, there
is a rather radical difference between the conduct of Soviet forces
in Afghanistan and the conduct of United States personnel in El
Salvador. The body of reports which we now have indicates that
Soviet forces in Afghanistan not only have committed systematic
violations of the rules of warfare, but also have engaged in inde-
cent human conduct on many occasions, including targeting civil-
ian populations for attack and using weapons prohibited by inter-
national law. On the other hand, one of the primary objectives of
the training programs being conducted by the United States per-
sonnel in El Salvador has been to instill respect for human rights
and humane conduct in the. personnel of the Salvadoran army and
security forces.
The situations in Afghanistan and El Salvador are so fundamen-
tally different that it is not useful to try to consider them in the
same light. Nonetheless, there is no room for us to be complacent
or self-congratulatory about the El Salvador situation. It clearly is
a situation in which violence and human suffering continue on a
massive scale. It is necessary for us to seek a peaceful resolution of
this conflict in the context of the democratic process, and this is
certainly the objective of the United States government.
' Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or
other Gases, and of Bacterialogical Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571,
T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
7 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Rela-
tive to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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